Migrant Labour in South Africa

7 & 8 February 2017

A summary report of the Mandela Initiative action dialogue in partnership with the Human Sciences Research Council and the University Fort Hare

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Background to this action dialogue
The Economic Performance and Development Unit of the Human Sciences Research Council held a conference and public action dialogue on “Migrant Labour in South Africa” with the Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Fort Hare’s East London Campus from 7 to 8 February 2017.

The meeting considered the histories and trends for migration for work within and into South Africa. It analysed how the crisis on South Africa’s platinum belt that led to the massacre of 36 miners at Marikana in 2012 has revealed the current material, social and political concerns of workers in the mining industry. It considered the role of women who are often now living with their families and working alongside migrant male workers. It further explored the rural-urban interface occupied by migrant labourers and the relationship between migrancy and rural development.

Introduction
Professor Sakhela Buhlungu, Vice-Chancellor, University of Fort Hare
Professor Francis Wilson, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town and Fort Hare
Professor Leslie Bank, Human Sciences Research Council and University of Fort Hare

The 150-year old migrant labour system underpinned the policies of the apartheid regime and has left a legacy of great socio-economic damage, including fractured communities and families and an impoverished rural hinterland deprived of the productive economic benefits that accrue from labour. Apartheid efforts to prevent black urbanisation contributed to deindustrialisation and the collapse of sub-regional economies in the Ciskei and Transkei. A 30-strong group of leading scholars and practitioners have come together to seek to heal some of this damage.

The Employment Board of Africa (TEBA), which was established to supply South Africa’s gold mines with cheap labour, used to have an office in every town in the Transkei to process workers in and out of migrancy. The archives from those offices need to be researched as part of an interdisciplinary project incorporating African narratives of migrancy which should seek to dissolve the silos that have often sought to make the topic the preserve of academic elites. Fort Hare scholars need to be part of this project, since they live with these communities.

Trends in Labour Migration and Remittances in Post-Apartheid South Africa
Professor Dorrit Posel, Economics, University of the Witwatersrand

Although the number of households with at least one absent member (generally a migrant worker) increased from 2 million to 2.5 million between 1993 and 2008, the absolute number of such households fell from 24% to 18% of the total.

Under apartheid, people were forced to migrate for work but not permitted to take their families with them or move permanently. The migration was “circular” or “oscillating”: the migrant workers would often become members of a destination household but also remain part of a household of origin to which they would return when sick or upon retirement.

Expectations that such patterns of migration would be replaced by “linear” and more permanent migration of worker with families following the removal of apartheid restrictions upon movement have not been entirely met – although patterns of remittances sent home indicate that levels of
temporary migration and dual household membership are declining. For example, although the total sum of private transfers has increased, the share of households receiving such transfers has dropped dramatically.

**Urban and Rural Migration Dynamics**

*Dr Monde Makiwane, HSRC*

Migrant flows continue to damage the rural economy in the Eastern Cape, depleting the region of crucial skills in a brain-drain to the cities and towns, in particular those of the Western Cape. The flow of remittances is uneven, often only lasting for two years or so after the migrant gains work and before other, new socio-economic obligations – such as a second household in the city – mount. In this regard, social grants, although representing a much smaller total sum than remittances, provide a crucial source of income to rural families.

**Translocality and Urban-Rural Binaries of Post-Apartheid Geography**

*Emma Monama, African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand*

Translocality needs to be recognised in urban planning. The post-1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) proposed a strategy to reduce spatial inequities and distortions in housing delivery. However, green field development often exacerbates social inequalities and the RDP's efforts to build mass housing proved uneconomical and failed to create integrated development.

After the United Nations' establishment of Millennium Development Goals from 2000, the government pursued a breaking new ground (BNG) programme which aimed to eradicate poverty and slums by building sustainable human settlements. Although ostensibly concerned with the effects of rural migration, the programme has focussed on eradicating informal settlements in South African towns and cities rather than addressing the urban-rural interface and the centrality of mobility for many workers and residents.

In addition, the form of housing delivery has been forged at central government level on the basis of restitution and then exported nationwide often at the expense of the potential benefits that may accrue to local and regional economies from the adoption of other, more appropriate models.

**Labour in the South African Gold Mines: Past and Present**

*Professor Francis Wilson, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town and Fort Hare*

The migrant labour system in South Africa, which is 150 years old, was forged around the monopsonistic needs of the mainly British capitalists controlling the country's gold mines. They formed a cartel of employees and an agreed low wage for miners, who were recruited mainly from Mozambique and Malawi, as well as from Tanzania and the Transkei and Ciskei regions of South Africa. As a result, wages remained generally static for miners until the 1970s.

The system was adopted by apartheid planners to prevent black urbanisation, which ran counter to the regime’s establishment of Bantustans. The government sought to control single male labourers, bringing them in for work only but keeping women and children away. The apartheid regime developed a baroque administrative and infrastructural architecture, including pass laws, to exploit
and control black labour while ensuring this displacement of black communities. The system featured extreme measures to control workers. For example, a hostel for 1,800 men in Alexandria Township in Johannesburg was equipped with steel doors that would close at the touch of a button to manage riots. In the 1960s and 1970s, 3.5 million people were moved by the apartheid regime during forced removals. Migrant workers in the cities often had to travel long distances to work. For example, workers who had to live in KwanNdebele travelled six hours by bus every day to and from their jobs in Pretoria.

Despite the apparent short-term benefits of the highly organised system of remittances and deferred pay that supported migrant labour in the Eastern Cape, the long-term effect was to deplete the rural economy. The productive capital created by the miners was accumulated in and around Johannesburg, where they worked and were paid. The homes and towns and origin received little productive benefit. The system effectively generated poverty within the former Bantustans, which continue to suffer the greatest economic deprivation in South Africa.

**The Marikana Spirit: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa**

*Dr Luke Sinwell, Department of Sociology, University of Johannesburg*

The strike at Lonmin’s mines on the platinum belt were organised by rock drill operators outside formal union structures. The workers’ representatives met local line managers who had been given “line of sight” authorisation to negotiate with them, although there was a disjuncture with Lonmin’s national management who remained ensconced in talks with the National Union of Mineworkers, which did not represent the miners on the ground at Marikana.

The rock drill operators from the three shafts at Marikana – Karee, Eastern and Western – were asking for R12,500 a month, Under the impression that local managers were prepared to offer a deal, the workers marched to the local mine offices on August 11, 2012 – but were met with violence and fled to the nearby mountain in fear of their lives.

A mountain committee was formed and the workers’ struggle as migrants was expressed in a range of traditional idioms from their rural home. Five days later when the workers came down from the mountain, 34 miners were shot dead, including leaders of the strike action, and a further 78 were wounded by police. Many of the dead were shot in the back.

Subsequently, all the miners at the Amplats shafts in the Rustenburg platinum belt went on strike, demanding R16,070, including meal, safety and other allowances. The Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) became the dominant union in the platinum sector through its responsiveness to rank-and-file demands, co-opting the worker committees and launching the longest strike in South African mining history in 2014.

**Marikana and Mpondoland: The Connections between the Urban and the Rural**

*Gavin Hartford, independent consultant*

An inspiration for the strike at Marikana in 2012 had been the six-week wildcat strike at Implats at the beginning of the year which had been organised by rock drill operators while on leave in Mpondoland and was implemented the day after their return to work. They sought and won a tripling of their monthly wages to R9,000, in line with increases that had been granted the better-paid “miners” at Rustenburg.
The strike actions tore apart the industry and the framework for collective bargaining that had delivered industrial peace and which included union partners chosen on the basis of majoritarianism and the tripartite National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) partnership between business, organised labour and government.

The strike actions were driven by a decline in union democracy, with shop stewards increasingly co-opted with relatively well-paid positions, as well as a systemic refusal by management to address the problems faced by workers.

The consequent alienation of the workforce was compounded by increasing financial pressures on individual miners who often helped to support two families – one at work and another in Mpondoland – and were burdened by debts incurred through hire purchase payments on a range of brown and white goods.

**Human Settlement and Migration Strategies at Marikana: What Kind of Housing to Deliver?**  
*Catherine Cross*

Migrant mining camp identities have historically been a source of great social instability and have persisted since the end of apartheid despite often declining economic opportunities although the government now wants to manage them.

In relation to housing, many miners have chosen to leave the hostels provided by the employer, instead claiming a monthly allowance that now stands at R1,500 and spending R350 on renting land to build a shack. Such transit shack housing is often inherited – it enables access to the platinum belt where the next generation of migrant workers can get jobs – and the cycle of impermanence is repeated.

The government has proposed alternative housing options in order to break the cycle and create more permanent communities near the site of work, disincentivising workers from sending remittances and returning to their rural home. In this regard, the house on the hill in the Transkei which may be built with remittances has little monetary value compared with houses in the village near the platinum mine, which have doubled or tripled in value in the past two years.

After initially focusing on building RDP houses, the government’s attention has now shifted to offering (relatively expensive and tardy) accommodation to rent. However, this model largely overlooks householder interests. If you are renting, you are paying money that you should be using to build your own capital.

Instead, the government should adopt a second-order housing policy that would provide subsidies for those attempting to build their own houses. Using the informal housing ladder, many people can raise R40,000 to build a house – but they want proper infrastructure and services – reticulation, roads, schools, etc – and a resale market supported by security of tenure and sellable stands.

Such a second-order housing policy may leverage the interests of women in the mining communities, whose relationship with male migrant labourers are generally transactional and who may have or be seeking greater local ties for themselves and their families.
Action and Policy Session with Migrants, Duncan Village, East London

A meeting with migrant workers and their descendants and families at the hostels in Duncan Village, East London, where they have lived since 1959 revealed the failure of government agencies to improve living conditions and local services despite repeated promises to do so. The situation has led to violent protests during which residents have been killed by the police.

The former men-only, one-storey rows of hostels have been converted into family accommodation by dividing the former dormitories that each housed four workers into two, with each room now accommodating as many as 10 people. Living in such close quarters, the residents complained of a lack of privacy and free movement, problems sleeping and the health risks posed by the increased possibility of contagion.

None of the families possessed title deeds to the homes in which they have often lived for generations – the land is still owned by the local authority. An informally established local committee monitors residency in Duncan Village, which is open only to family members and not the residents of a neighbouring shack community.

Electrification has been achieved by largely informal means. All the hostels are roofed with asbestos, which is a cause of concern to the residents.

The migrant workers’ views of what constituted “home” varied. One tyre repairman denied that Duncan Village was his home and said that he sent remittances home to his family in the countryside and would return there when he retired. Another resident, Temba, a barber by trade, who was living in a former hostel with his family, said he would only retire to the countryside if he had the means to do so.

Many residents hoped to one day be allocated RDP housing, although they complained that they were not prioritised on the waiting list. They also expressed the need for yards, gardens and play areas for their children. The lack of leisure facilities created more pregnancies and bred juvenile delinquents, one said. In order of importance, the residents identified the need for better amenities; adequate housing; jobs; proper services; and leisure facilities.

Zimbabwe’s Migrants and South African Border Farms: The Roots of Impermanence

Dr Maxim Bolt, Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research and University of Birmingham

On South Africa’s border with Zimbabwe, decisions by farm foremen on whom to employ can influence which migrant labourers are permitted entry by South African border guards. Farmers seeking to distance themselves from previous paternalist employment practices increasingly seek to employ migrant workers to whom they extend minimal employment benefits.

However, employment within formalised labour hierarchies on farm estates offers some, albeit provisional, permanence, allowing migrant workers to organise their lives, making longer term plans, creating small-scale trade opportunities, forging new sexual and family relationships and even establishing residence.

Workers become rooted to different degrees. Achieving stability requires establishing connections with senior figures on the farms. For those with middle-class aspirations, attachment to earlier social mobility and norms of behaviour can prevent assimilation into the dominant working-class culture.
among migrant workers on the farms. However, the stakes in leaving the relative certainty of employment, food and shelter in the border plantations for the uncertain prospect of work in the city are often too high.

The expressions of nostalgia for home varied among the Zimbabwean migrant labourers. For some, sending remittances home sustained a connection and a dual life even if the economic prospects for returning remained dim in the short term. For others the notion of return was more imagined than real.

**Engaging the Changing Faces of Zimbabwean Migration in Southern Africa: Key Question for Policymakers and Theorists**

*Dr Khangelani Moyo, African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand*

Since 2000, when Zimbabwe was plunged into an economic crisis, the scale and nature of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa has changed significantly, with increasing numbers crossing the border and staying for longer. Many more women crossed the border seeking work and increasingly migrants were buried or gave birth in South Africa.

After 2000, the South African government’s response was generally to deny the existence of an economic (and political) crisis and to arrest, detain and deport Zimbabwean migrants. Many Zimbabweans used asylum applications as a surrogate migration channel. In 2009, 206,000 Zimbabweans applied for asylum and many of them became suspended in the system awaiting an outcome.

Tshwane sought to regularise Zimbabweans caught in the asylum system through the Documentation Zimbabwe Project (DZP) and subsequently the Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP). The extension of these papers represented recognition by the South African government of the more permanent status of Zimbabwean migrants. However, the Department of Home Affairs has said it will not extend these permits from December 2017.

Proper planning needs to be implemented for the 3 million Zimbabweans – give or take 1 million – residing in South Africa, particularly given the emergence of a new generation of South African-born Zimbabweans. Their movement should also be placed within the context of the exponential growth of migration globally. In this regard, South Africa’s and Botswana’s immigration controls contravene the free movement protocol established in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which seeks to create a regional pool of labour and broaden emancipation.

**An Alternative Historical Interpretation of International Labour Recruitment in the South African Mines**

*Dr Tendai Chiguware, Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research*

Despite the expense and the general surplus of domestic labour, South Africa’s mining industry employed mostly foreign workers since it was established in the late 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century. In general, the flow of foreign migrant labour was only interrupted by external factors such as Mozambican independence in 1975 which led to Maputo refusing to send workers to South Africa for a time. The preference of mining companies for foreign workers since 1886 may have fostered xenophobia among a disgruntled South African labour force.
Employment of unregulated foreign labour enabled mine-owners to exploit the available manpower in pursuit of maximum output. From the industrialists’ point of view, the availability of significant sources of labour from different regions enabled them to retain control over the labour supply, tapping a range of sources as required. It also supported the anti-black urbanisation policies of the apartheid regime.

**Spaces of Perpetual Perplexity: Migrant Hostels in KwaZulu-Natal**

*Dr Nomkhosi Xulu, University of KwaZulu-Natal*

The former all-male hostels for transit workers have been renamed Community Residential Units (CRUs) implying a fundamental change in line with the introduction of democracy of 1994. Although these CRUs were originally housed in the same buildings as the former hostels, new two or three-storey ones were built featuring modern units with two bedrooms, a bathroom and a kitchenette from 2000. However, due to the high numbers flocking to the cities even if there are no jobs, each unit is often occupied by more than one family.

Rather than reuniting old families as intended, the former hostels have often fostered new systems of relations between men and women. High levels of unemployment and overcrowding have created spaces full of crime, unsatisfied desires and conflict. The former hostels represent spaces of perplexity in which plans and hopes for a new life are often confounded by present realities.

Despite their new definition as a community space housing women and children, the CRUs, such as KwaMashu hostel north of Durban, are still regarded as a house of men, including by the resident women. Although the children of the mothers in the CRUs have the right to be there officially, they generally don’t claim it.

Much conflict in the CRUs and the challenges faced by their residents are genderised. Some men say that the hostels were better, more ordered, when they were official apartheid-era spaces and that jobs were more plentiful then. The present lack of facilities and jobs is often blamed on the women. Some men complain about the presence of sanitary towels and nappies.

However, residents are guaranteed a daily meal and a roof over their heads (which can disincentivise them from seeking opportunities elsewhere) and the collective has an important role in providing social stability in the working-class culture of the CRUs. Most residents go back home when they can afford it.

**Migrancy and Mining Femininities in South Africa**

*Dr Asanda Benya, Sociology Department, University of Cape Town*

Women in the mining communities of the platinum belt are not an homogenous group – some are local Tshwane women, some consider themselves country wives (having moved from their home villages to be with their husbands), others are town women who may have been in Rustenburg and surrounds for more than ten years, are generally unemployed and hardly ever return home. However, even after after 20 years, a Xhosa-speaking woman would still not be considered a local.

Notwithstanding these differences, their socio-economic status is often precarious and is almost completely structured by the patterns and nature of work at the mines. Their labour helps to prepare and support the men in their work. Depending on the time that their husbands' shifts start,
the women rise early, often at 3am, to fetch water and firewood. Their daily round takes place within a 15km radius of the mines. Their conversations are shaped by the safety and labour concerns of the miners. They supported the struggle for R12,500 a month.

Women can now work in underground mines at Rustenburg, including some from the Eastern Cape, although officially only locals are permitted under the post-1994 rules.

Women who mine must learn to adopt specific genderised behaviours. In the cage that descends into the mine, women must take up a little space and hold their breasts. Underground they have to adopt the body language expected of expert workers – for example, in how they position their body when holding down rocks.

Outside the mine, their role as wage-earners with financial responsibilities for families back home confers a new status. However, when these women mine workers return home to their villages, they say they struggle to relate to the villagers – not because they have been urbanised but because of the kind of people that they have become in the mines. In this regard, the experience of these workers and the exodus of women from the Eastern Cape to the mining areas have challenged the nostalgic vision of the rural site as "home".

The alienation from the Rustenburg area felt by many women in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre was compounded after they returned home for the funerals of the killed miners in the Eastern Cape and realised that things back home had changed and they didn’t feel quite the connection that they had expected.

**Rural Livelihoods and Post-1994 Social Change in the Former Transkei**

*Professor Michael Aliber, Agricultural and Rural Development Research Institute, University of Fort Hare*

A truism of development discourse is that there are two South Africas: one is the site of high economic importance and great density and the other, the former homelands, is neither. The policy prescriptions to resolve this duality include: providing basic services and encouraging people to move to the cities; improving infrastructure and the economic linkages to the rural areas (although some policy makers have argued that this may actually damage the latter’s economic prospects); and massive support for agriculture.

However, the basis for these prescriptions – that the former homelands are economically bereft – may be regarded as simplistic. For example, the increasingly youthful population of towns in the Eastern Cape such as Buffalo City and Mount Frere has more in common with South Africa’s cities than the rural hinterland. Similarly, the improvement in the employment rate in municipalities in the former homelands is similar to that in the metros, with huge increases in employment from 2001 to 2011.

The interdependence of rural and metropolitan areas in the Eastern Cape has increased with the rise of the taxi industry. Villagers used to buy their wares from local stores which, in turn, bought their goods in town. Now, villagers increasingly buy their supplies directly from urban retailers.

Although opportunities have been missed in the development of the agricultural sector, many jobs have been created in construction in the former homelands. Furthermore, local development appears to have been boosted by the relatively large sums set aside for investment – 6.7% of income in rural areas.
Food Poverty, Hunger and Household Production in Rural Eastern Cape Households
Professor Mike Rogan, The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University

University of London economics professor John Sender recently proposed placing a moratorium on all support for small-scale farming and self-sufficiency in a policy paper commissioned by the premier of the Eastern Cape. He argued that such agriculture produced few economic benefits and that wages offered the most important source of support for poor, rural households.

However, this policy precept fails to account for the large number of rural households that seemingly exist on “thin air” and the role that subsistence agriculture may play in this.

The Eastern Cape is home to 22% of the 2.4 million African households that report “agricultural” activities. Partial subsistence agriculture is a particular feature of many of these. Such farming households are often just as reliant on market-sourced food as other households and generally fail to create employment or surplus agricultural outputs.

However, their benefits include: improved nutrition and potentially higher incomes. Although small farmers tend to be poor, they are less poor compared with households in other areas.

In addition, food security may be enhanced in households engaging in partial subsistence agriculture – the extra food produced by poor, small farmers is relatively more important as a source of nutrition that in other households.

In this regard, although the risk of hunger is greater for those below the food poverty line, the likelihood of family members in this category going to bed hungry is smaller in the former homelands and agricultural households that have less access to wages as a means of support. It has also been shown that the production of small agricultural surpluses for sale can enhance food security.

In relation to Sender’s bold policy prescription, it must be noted that although rural wages are crucial, food security remains an immediate concern. The plight of poor agricultural households should not be regarded as a zero-sum game.

Mobility and Spatial Planning on the Transkei Wild Coast
Siyabu Manona, Independent Consultant

The boundaries of customary and colonial constructs of land often overlap. In addition, patterns of human settlement often straddle historical boundaries, for example when villagers are allocated land for their residential and arable needs.

A data infrastructure project at Amajingqi traditional council, Willovale in the Transkei revealed that the land there was mapped in multifarious and often contradictory ways. For example, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had divided the place into five distinct areas; the Surveyor-General divided it into two; the Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs had its own delineations; StatSA listed 13 place names for the area; the local community divided it into ten; and the municipal wards are also aligned separately. No common reference point exists to enable comprehensive planning and service delivery for the area.
The confusion – particularly between Roman law notions of land ownership and customary law versions which place greater emphasis on use – and the current political dispensation allows traditional leaders to exercise sovereignty over both people and land, often translating boundary disputes into causes for conflict.

In this regard, laws are widely flouted due to lacklustre enforcement. As a result, indigenous forests are being plundered; and 160 illegal sand mining sites have been established along the wild coast, with RDP housing mushrooming in these areas. The chiefs do as they wish.

Partly due to a lack of effective translation of national statutes into by-laws that correspond with local practice, the bodies of customary law and statutory law are increasingly at odds. In addition, liberal anti-colonial sensitivities led to the adoption of a position that the integrity of customary law may be best protected by leaving it unwritten. However, codification is now necessary. Normative principles for customary law should be articulated and then issued as a basis for an evolving system of case law. Customary law must further find expression in municipal by-laws.

**Concluding Remarks**

The economic development of the homelands should be accurately mapped to identify the full range of impacts of 150 years of migrant labour. Greater activism should be fostered to address crucial impediments to economic stability and growth in these areas, including the need to provide adequate housing, train women, educate children properly and address new issues of land exploitation. The development discourse should be shifted from an exclusive focus on city states as the levers of South African national development and the exploitation of rural land as a pawn of divisive political nationalism at the expense of its productive value.